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Abstract 
 
We describe research on a comprehensive ontology of 
sociotechnical and organizational factors for insider 
threat (SOFIT) and results of an expert knowledge 
elicitation study. The study examined how alternative 
insider threat assessment models may reflect 
associations among constructs beyond the 
relationships defined in the hierarchical class 
structure. Results clearly indicate that individual 
indicators contribute differentially to expert judgments 
of insider threat risk. Further, models based on 
ontology class structure more accurately predict expert 
judgments. There is some (although weak) empirical 
evidence that other associations among constructs—
such as the roles that indicators play in an insider 
threat exploit—may also contribute to expert 
judgments of insider threat risk. These findings 
contribute to ongoing research aimed at development 
of more effective insider threat decision support tools.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
A serious threat is posed by insiders who seek to 
destroy, steal, or leak sensitive information, or act in 
ways that expose their organization to outside attacks. 
An insider threat is “a current or former employee, 
contractor, or other business partner who has or had 
authorized access to an organization’s network, 
system, or data and who intentionally (or 
unintentionally) exceeds or misuses that access to 
negatively affect the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the organization’s information or 
information systems” [1]. Annual industry surveys 
consistently show that insiders pose the second greatest 
cybersecurity threat, exceeded only by hackers, and 
that insider attacks are the costliest to organizations 
[2][3]. An active research area for development of 
more effective detection and mitigation approaches is 
the identification, validation, and integration of cyber 
and behavioral (sociotechnical) indicators of insider 
threat risk [4][5][6].  
This paper describes continuing work on a 
comprehensive insider threat ontology [6][7] that 
supports research to develop more effective decision 
support tools, facilitates insider threat program 
evaluation s, and promotes understanding of the 
complex insider threat domain. A hallmark of the 
ontology—called Sociotechnical and Organizational 
Factors for Insider Threat (SOFIT)—is the inclusion of 
behavioral, social, and organizational factors in 
addition to the cyber/technical factors traditionally 
identified with insider threat risk. A general description 
of SOFIT and its class structure is provided in [7]. 
While the ontology was based originally on a 
unidimensional hierarchical taxonomy of factors, 
relationships have been specified to more fully 
characterize additional associations among insider 
threat indicators and related constructs; these 
associations extend the ontology beyond the simple 
hierarchical taxonomy from which it was derived. It 
now represents a collection of taxonomies. Indeed, this 
paper focuses on how the additional specification of 
associations among constructs yields a broader 
ontology that further informs insider threat assessment 
and mitigation. A primary objective of the current 
research is to examine how individual indicators and 
patterns of indicators contribute to judgments of insider 
threat risk. Though preliminary and requiring further 
research, results suggest both research and operational 
implications favoring the inclusion of behavioral and 
sociotechnical indicators. 
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2. General model  
 
A general context and framework that informs the 
SOFIT ontology is shown in Fig. 1. This framework 
depicts presumed underlying factors and processes at 
work as one progresses along a critical pathway that 
may culminate in a malicious insider exploit, 
consistent with the Critical Pathway model described 
in [8]. Since this framework does not describe 
processes associated with unintentional (non-
malicious) insider threats [9][10], it only partially 
informs SOFIT. 
The model distinguishes personal (individual) 
factors from external factors, and distal factors from 
proximal factors. Personal factors include 
psychological constructs and predispositions, 
internalized cultural norms and ideology, and 
capabilities (i.e., knowledge, skills, abilities), which, 
when combined with external factors, may increase the 
individual’s motivation to act. Personal factors 
comprise the proclivity or vulnerability to malicious 
insider activity and include personal predispositions. 
External factors include stressors, opportunities that 
present themselves, and actions by the organization 
that may impact motivation. Distal factors include 
internal triggering processes, where personal and 
external factors generate an emotional/cognitive 
response that culminates in malicious intent. Proximal 
factors are behaviors that lead to an attack. While 
proximal factors are the most likely to be identified 
following the crime, we suggest that distal factors 
reflecting motivations may be most useful for proactive 
approaches that attempt to identify individuals who 
pose greater risks of committing these crimes. 
Altogether, these processes describe the complex 
mechanism at play for any potential malicious insider 
threat. This framework is strongly influenced by earlier 
works that describe the CMO 
(capability/motivation/opportunity) model (e.g., [11]), 
the critical pathway model [8], and numerous 
behavioral/psychologically oriented works (e.g., 
[1][3][4][5][7]). 
Each element of this framework can be directly or 
indirectly measured. Following the approaches 
described in [4] [12], we decomposed the various 
constructs into a hierarchical set of factors that 
supports analyses of data to infer observables, 
indicators and threat behaviors. In this proactive 
computational approach to insider threat mitigation, 
data are processed to reveal observables; collections of 
observables are analyzed to infer indicators 
(collections or patterns of observables); indicators are 
examined to infer target behaviors. Malicious (threat) 
behaviors are combinations or sequences of indicators 
and observables that represent a pattern of actions 
associated with an exploit. Recognizing target threat 
behaviors is therefore a complex, model-based 
classification process that involves inferences about 
multifaceted combinations or sequences of behavioral, 
psychological, and technical indicators. This 
interpretation of the threat assessment process provides 
a key rationale for related modeling efforts and the 
design of expert knowledge elicitation studies initially 
reported in [6] and [7] and extended here.  
 
3. SOFIT Framework  
The SOFIT ontology derives from a systematic review, 
analysis and synthesis of existing research, case 
studies, and guidelines by the insider threat research 
community. It is currently 6-7 levels deep, with 271 
constructs defined as individual (human) factors and 49 
as organizational factors [7]. Classes, which represent 
objects with similar structure and properties, are 
arranged hierarchically: subclasses or members of the 
classes are referred to as indicators [4][5][12]. 
 
Figure 1. General Model 
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Figure 3. SOFIT Ontology Higher-Level Classes 
Fig. 2 shows the main classes comprising the upper 
levels of the hierarchy. Fundamentally, the ontology 
attempts to describe individuals and organizations with 
various characteristics that increase the likelihood that 
an intentional or unintentional insider threat will occur. 
The ontology addresses both malicious and non-
malicious (unintentional) insider threats, and it 
distinguishes between actions performed by insiders 
from those by organizations (e.g., problematic 
responses to potential threats, poor institutional 
policies, or security practices). SOFIT is broader and 
deeper compared to other insider threat ontologies 
(e.g., [13][14]). The constructs Factor (comprising 
Individual and Organizational factors), Actor 
(comprising Person and Organization) and Intention 
(Malicious versus Non-Malicious) are at the top of the 
Insider Threat hierarchy. Classes deeper in the 
hierarchy largely consist of groupings of characteristics 
at various levels of abstraction. The groups of classes 
may be related by co-occurrence or cause and effect. 
Characteristics at the lowest level of abstraction are 
differentiated by threat type, indicator role, and level of 
concern.  
This paper primarily focuses on the individual 
factors associated with insider threats; five parent 
classes and underlying indicator classes are shown in 
Fig. 3. The ontology accounts for both malicious and 
non-malicious (unintentional) insider threats, and it 
distinguishes between actions performed by employees 
(as insiders) and actions performed by organizations 
(such as problematic responses to potential threats, 
poor institutional policies, or security practices). 
Individual factors reflect behaviors, attitudes, personal 
issues, sociocultural or ideological factors, and various 
biographical (life narrative) factors that may indicate 
increased risk. Protective factors (i.e., those that 
decrease risk) are not considered in this work. This 
branch of the taxonomy reflects the substantial body of 
work by a diverse set of researchers and practitioners 
focusing on concerning behaviors, sociocultural 
Figure 2. Individual Factor Branch of SOFIT Ontology 
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factors, and psychological factors underlying insider 
threats, as shown in Fig.3. Examination and discussion 
of works relating to psychological constructs 
(especially [5][15]) led us to differentiate enduring 
psychological traits from dynamic states, consistent 
with findings that these two constructs are reliably 
distinct despite their admitted overlap (e.g., [16][17]) 
and with the diverse body of psychological research 
that hinges on (e.g., [18][19][20]) or capitalizes on 
(e.g., [21][22]) that distinction. Finally, the inclusion of 
personal history and sociocultural factors derives from 
research and case studies (e.g., [23][24][25][26]). We 
adopted a “life narrative” factor construct based on the 
notion that certain sociocultural factors may be 
discerned from life narratives of individuals [27]. 
Fig. 4 depicts lower-level constructs within the 
Individual Factor branch: viz., a decomposition of the 
Job Performance class into two deeper-level 
subclasses, “Cyberloafing” and “Negative Evaluation.” 
Within each of these subclasses are observables (such 
as “Excessive Personal Use of Work Computer”); 
lower-level constructs are defined but not shown in the 
figure. Measuring observables requires specifying and 
implementing detectors associated with these 
constructs (e.g., a detector for excessive personal use 
of work computer might be number of visits to non-
work-related websites). SOFIT stops short of 
specifying detectors, since these are organization-
specific and their specification would likely increase 
the size of the ontology by an order of magnitude. 
 
4. Associated Constructs 
 
Our research team relied upon research literature 
and our collective expert judgments to examine 
numerous associations among the factors represented 
in the ontology and relationships between these factors 
and other relevant constructs. We considered possible 
associations of the insider threat indicators with the 
following threat types [1]: 
 
● Insider Sabotage: An act by an insider to direct 
specific harm toward an organization or its assets. 
● Insider Data Theft/Exfiltration: Theft of sensitive 
information by an insider. 
● Insider Fraud: Modification, addition, deletion, or 
theft, of an organization’s data for personal gain, 
leading to an identity crime (e.g., identity theft, 
credit card fraud). 
● Unintentional Insider Threat (UIT): An act or 
failure to act by an insider, without malicious 
intent, that causes harm or substantially increases 
the probability of future harm to an organization or 
its assets. 
● Workplace Violence: Any act or threat of physical 
violence, harassment, intimidation, or other 
threatening disruptive behavior that occurs at the 
work site. 
 
Based on our own judgments, the coauthors (FLG, 
JP, DEB, YML) individually and by consensus 
identified associations of individual factors with these 
six threat types. Considered preliminary until validated 
against independent expert knowledge or empirical 
evidence, these additional relationships among 
ontology constructs can support queries to generate 
lists of factors associated with insider threat types.  
Using a similar individual-and-consensus 
procedure, we considered possible relationships 
between insider threat indicators and certain constructs 
that help to describe an indicator’s role in the insider 
threat exploit: Precipitating Event, Predisposition, 
Behavioral Precursor, Technical Precursor, Access 
Path, and Contextual Factor (these constructs are 
defined in Table 1). Table 2 shows output from a query 
listing factors associated with the role, Predisposition. 
These factors come from different ontology classes 
(e.g., Boundary Violation, Job Performance, 
Psychological Factor/Enduring Trait). 
Figure 4. Job Performance branch of 
Individual Factor hierarchy 
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Table 1. SOFIT Constructs Characterizing an Indicator’s Role in Insider Threat Exploits 
 
Table 2. Factors associated with the role “Predispositions” 
 
The primary associations of the ontology describe 
the hierarchical nature of the indicators. The 
associations between parent classes and child classes 
such as those illustrated in Table 2 are the major 
organizing principle for the indicators. Role type 
associations are considered secondary because 
indicators within a role are more heterogenous and 
less closely related. However, this perspective is 
based on narrative evidence alone. Indeed, it is 
possible to develop an alternative ontological 
structure based on roles instead of the class structure 
described in Section 3. It is therefore appropriate to 
ask: What aspects of the ontology (e.g., individual 
indicators, their roles, and parent class relationships) 
might best account for expert judgments of insider 
threat? We conducted an expert knowledge elicitation 
study to address this and related questions. 
 
5. Expert Knowledge Elicitation Study 
 
The ontology class structure is a framework for 
describing the domain of insider threat indicators. 
Further, SOFIT’s structure encapsulates an inherent 
schema that we hypothesize analysts use to make 
judgments about insider threat risk. For example, an 
Construct Definition Examples 
Precipitating 
Event 
An event that triggers or motivates the insider to carry 
out an insider crime  
1.1.4.3.4.4.5  Disciplinary Action 
1.1.4.3.4.4.6. Passed over for promotion 
Personal 
Predisposition 
A characteristic historically linked to a propensity to 
exhibit malicious insider behavior 
1.1.5.2.1.5. Low Honesty-Humility 
1.1.5.2.2.1.1. Manipulative 
1.1.5.2.2.2. Narcissism 
Behavioral 
Precursor 
An individual action, event, or condition that involves 
personal or interpersonal behaviors and that precedes and 
is associated with insider activity          
1.1.5.1.2.5. Disgruntlement 
1.1.5.1.2.6. Overly Critical 
Technical 
Precursor  
An individual action, event, or condition that involves 
computer or electronic media and that precedes and is 
associated with malicious insider activity   
1.1.3.6.3. Delete or edit audit logs 
1.1.3.7. Suspicious Communication 
Access Path Sequence of one or more access points along a critical 
path (also known as "attack vector" or "kill chain") 
 
1.1.3.4.4. Unauthorized storage device 
1.1.3.4.1. Attempts to access prohibited file-
sharing websites 
Contextual 
Variable 
Factor that adds context (not necessarily predictive) 1.1.4.2.1.3. Unexplained affluence 
1.1.4.3.1. Age 
1.1.4.3.2. Gender 
1.1.1. Boundary Violation 
1.1.1.2. Blurred Professional Boundaries 
1.1.1.2.1. Excessive Socialization 
1.1.2. Job Performance 
1.1.2.2. Negative Evaluation 
1.1.2.2.6. Missing or Late To Meetings 
1.1.5.2. Enduring Trait 
1.1.5.2.1. Personality Dimensions 
1.1.5.2.1.1. Emotional Instability/ Neuroticism 
1.1.5.2.1.2. Low- Conscientiousness 
1.1.5.2.1.2.1. Unreliable 
1.1.5.2.1.2.2. Impulsivity 
1.1.5.2.1.2.3. Poor Time Management 
1.1.5.2.1.3. Disagreeableness 
1.1.5.2.1.3.1. Socially Averse 
1.1.5.2.1.3.2. Rebellious- Nonconforming  
1.1.5.2.1.4. Excitement-seeking 
1.1.5.2.1.5. Low Honesty- Humility 
1.1.5.2.2.  Dark Triad 
1.1.5.2.2.1. Machiavellianism 
1.1.5.2.2.1.1. Manipulative 
1.1.5.2.2.2. Narcissism 
1.1.5.2.2.2.1. Self- Centered 
1.1.5.2.2.2.2. Grandiosity 
1.1.5.2.2.2.3. Rejects Criticism 
1.1.5.2.2.2.4. Lack of Empathy 
1.1.5.2.2.3. Psychopathy 
1.1.5.2.2.3.1. Callousness 
1.1.5.2.2.3.2. Lack of Remorse 
1.1.5.2.2.3.3. Sadism 
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analyst may not be gravely concerned about a case 
within an organization unless an indicator from the 
data manipulation class is present. Likewise, the role 
of an indicator may provide valuable information 
about how an analyst interprets a case. For example, 
an analyst may deem a case less worthy of further 
investigation because there is no precipitating event 
or other factor indicating a motive. Therefore, the 
class structure and role structure may provide 
explanatory power for modeling expert judgments of 
potential insider threat cases. 
 
5.1. Research Questions 
  
Our research questions center on the hypothesis 
that expert judgments of the threat/risk rating (level 
of concern) for an indicator in isolation will provide a 
relatively powerful way to predict judgments of 
combinations of indicators (i.e., threat/risk rankings 
of cases). This is suggested by previous findings 
[5][7], but here we focus on more specific model-
based questions: 
1) Do the threat/risk ratings for individual 
indicators predict the threat ranks of cases? 
(Sum-of-Risk model) 
2) Does a count of the number of indicators from 
each of the parent classes in a case predict the 
rank of the case? (Class-Count model) 
3) Does a count of the number of indicators from 
each of the 6 possible roles predict the rank of 
the case? (Role-Count model) 
4) Do the class-count and role-count models 
contribute independently to the prediction of 
case rank? 
5) Do the class-count and role-count models predict 
case rank above and beyond sum-of-risk model?  
 
5.2. Method and Procedure 
  
Thirteen experts from at least five participating 
organizations representing both research and 
operational experience participated in the study. 
Participants were recruited via a snowball 
recruitment method (seeded from our contacts across 
the research/operational communities). All had more 
than 5 total years of experience in insider threat or 
related fields, and 12 experts had 11 or more years of 
experience. In Part I of the study (survey open for 3 
months), each of the participants provided ratings of 
level of concern for 202 indicators (out of the 271 
individual indicators) in the ontology [ratings were 
on a 0-100 scale, where 0 = no concern at all and 
100 = gravest concern about an actual exploit or 
strong inclination/likelihood of committing an 
exploit). Seven of these experts, all with 11 or more 
years of experience, opted to go on to Part II of the 
study (open for 2 months after Part I). In Part II, 
participants ranked 45 stratified random cases 
presented as combinations of 2 to 5 individual 
indicators. The cases were constructed to balance the 
number of indicators and degree of concern as 
considered by the experimenters who judged cases as 
low, medium, or high concern. Except for five cases 
that were given to everyone as “anchors”, the 
remaining 40 cases varied across participants. An 
example of a case (considered by the experimenters 
to represent high concern) is the following, with 
indicators enclosed in brackets: 
 
[Resigned] [Extreme Discontent] [Establish Backdoor] 
[Transfer Large Amount of Data] [Strong Reaction to 
Organizational Sanctions] 
 
Cases comprised simply the list of indicator labels 
(as above); definitions of indicators were available 
for review. Instructions for this ranking task were to 
sort cases into five "bins" corresponding to increasing 
levels of concern (Low, Low-Moderate, Moderate, 
Moderate-High, Extreme), and then to rank-order the 
cases in each bin from highest concern to lowest 
concern. This results in a rank-ordering for the set of 
cases. The 315 cases ranked by the 7 experts were the 
unit of analysis for all regression analyses. 
 
5.3. Results 
  
5.3.1. Quantitative Models. We examined five 
models that attempt to predict the expert’s ranking of 
the level of threat in the cases, based on the indicators 
present in them. We use the variable, R, to denote the 
predicted level of threat or risk specified by each of 
these models.  
• Counting model. R = Σxi, where xi has the value 
of 1 if indicator i is present, otherwise 0. Thus, if 
there are n indicators in a case, the risk will be n, 
irrespective of any differences in threat level for 
individual indicators. 
• Regression model. R = Σbixi, where bi is the 
regression weight for indicator i. The regression 
model estimates many empirically-derived 
weights to predict the case rankings. 
• Sum-of-Risk model. The risk for a case is the 
sum of the ratings of concern (ri) for the 
individual indicators contained in the case, i.e., R 
= Σrixi, where the ri represents the rating of 
concern for indicator i.  
• Class-Count model sums the weights based on 
the parent class for each indicator represented in 
a case, i.e., R = Σcj(i)xi, where cj(i) is an 
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empirically-derived weight for the parent class 
associated with indicator i.  
• Role-Count model counts the number of roles 
represented, or R = Σrk(i)xi,, where rk(i) is an 
empirically-derived weight for the role 
associated with indicator i. 
 
5.3.2. Modeling Results. Consistent with previous 
findings [5][7], the predictive power of a Counting 
model (using only the number of indicators observed) 
provides a logical lower bound on our measure of 
predictive strength (R2 = 0.26); whereas, a 
Regression model freely estimating the weight of 
each indicator on rank provides a logical upper bound 
(R2 = 0.76).  
We compared the performance of the other three 
models with the upper and lower bound alternatives 
presented by the Counting and Regression models. 
The Sum-of-Risk model predicted the rankings 
nearly twice as well as the Counting model (R2 = 
0.48). The Class-Count model predicted case ranks 
(R2 = 0.54) slightly better than the Sum-of-Risk 
model. Table 3 shows the beta weights and 
significance levels for the parent class indicators in 
the Class-Count model1. Note that because lower 
ranks represent higher concern, negative regression 
weights are expected.  
The Role-Count model (R2 = 0.42) was 
somewhat less predictive of case ranks than the Sum-
of-Risk model. Table 4 shows the beta weights and 
significance levels for the Role-Count model. 
Notably, and surprisingly considering that all factors 
are assumed to reflect some degree of risk/threat, the 
role type of Personal Predisposition attained a 
positive weight (β = 0.15).  
Including both the class-structure and the role-
structure in the analyses provides explanatory power; 
however, there is a high potential for overlap. The 
relative incremental validities of parent class and role 
type were examined to determine if the contributions 
are independent. Role type predicted significantly 
beyond parent class, F(1,312) = 6.237, p = .013, ΔR2 
= 0.010. Similarly, parent class predicted 
significantly beyond role type, F(1,312) = 58.447, p 
< .001, ΔR2 = 0.094. These results supported the 
notion that parent class and role type provide 
independent contributions to the expert judgments of 
threat rank. Although statistically significant, the 
                                                 
1 The 29 parent classes in Table 3 differ slightly from the 
most current representation (Fig 3); subsequent to the 
study, some indicator classes (e.g., attendance, affect) were 
placed lower in the hierarchy and therefore do not appear in 
the figure. We replicated the analyses using the current 
class structure, obtaining similar weights and an R2 of 0.52. 
incremental validity of role type over parent class 
was small, which implies parent class accounts for 
most of the variance and that the independent 
variance contributed by role type is relatively limited.  
 
Table 3. Weights for Count of Parent Class 
 
Parent Class    β 
Boundary Violation  
Concerning Work Habits -0.13*** 
Blurred Professional Boundaries 0.00 
Interpersonal Problems -0.16*** 
Boundary Probing -0.21*** 
Social Engineering -0.05 
Minor Policy Violation -0.12*** 
Security Violation -0.28*** 
Major Security Violation -0.31*** 
Job Performance  
Cyberloafing -0.05 
Attendance 0.03 
Negative Evaluation -0.13** 
Cybersecurity Violation  
Authentication/Authorization -0.21*** 
Data Access Patterns -0.23*** 
Network Patterns -0.32*** 
Data Transfer Patterns -0.33*** 
Command Usage -0.22*** 
Data Manipulation -0.27*** 
Suspicious Communication -0.21*** 
Life Narrative  
Criminal Record -0.07 
Financial Concern -0.07 
Personal History/Major Life Changes -0.08 
Behavioral Health Issues -0.07 
Disloyalty -0.21*** 
Radical Beliefs 0.00 
Suspicious Foreign Travel -0.18*** 
Psychological Factor  
Affect -0.09* 
Attitude -0.23*** 
(Concerning) Personality Dimensions -0.02 
Dark Triad -0.02 
*p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001 
 
Hierarchical regression was conducted to 
determine how much variance the Class-Count and 
Role-Count models account for beyond the Sum-of-
Risk model. In the first step, the Sum-of-Risk model 
was considered independently to determine the 
baseline variance accounted for, R2 = 0.48. The other 
two models were added in the second step and any 
increase in model fit was attributed to the added 
predictors, ΔR2 = 0.04. As expected, given the small 
independent prediction, parent class predicted beyond 
the sum of ratings of concern (β = -0.34, p < .001); 
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whereas, role type does not (β = -0.09, p = 0.25) 
when both structures are in the same model (see 
Table 5).  
Ultimately, the variance in expert ratings of 
concern in isolation predicted level of concern for a 
case relatively well. However, the judgment process 
for cases is not solely explained as a simple 
summation of the individual risks. The additional 
prediction provided by parent class implies that the 
adjustment from a simple sum involves the parent 
class structure in some fashion. The lack of additional 
prediction from role type implies that the adjustment 
either does not involve role type or that the role type 
overlaps with parent class or ratings of concern. 
 
Table 4. Weights for Count of Role Type 
 
Role Type          β 
Precipitating Event** -0.13** 
Personal Predisposition*** 0.15*** 
Behavioral Precursor*** -0.19*** 
Technical Precursor*** -0.30*** 
Access Path*** -0.34*** 
Contextual Variable* -0.14* 
*p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001 
 
Table 5. Incremental Prediction of Case Rank 
over Sum-of-Risk 
  
Predictor R2  β 
Step 1*** 0.484***  
    Sum-of-Risk***  -0.70*** 
Step 2*** 0.525***  
    Sum-of-Risk***  -0.33*** 
    Parent Class***  -0.34*** 
    Role Type  -0.09 
*p<.05  **p<.01  ***p<.001 
 
6. Discussion 
The indicator level-of-concern values and number 
of indicators from each parent class predict expert 
judges’ ranking of insider threat cases. As expected, 
the indicators for major security violation, network 
pattern, and data transfer pattern were the most 
predictive of the threat ranks for cases. Indicator role 
type was a substantially weaker predictor of case 
rankings, with, technical precursors and access path 
indicators showing the strongest relationship.  
When paired with ratings of concern to make 
predictions about case rankings, the number of parent 
classes represented in the indicators (class structure) 
outweighed the number of role types (role structure).  
Relative to the Counting model and the freely 
estimated Regression model, the predictive strength 
of the Class-Count model lends support for the 
ontological structure that was built for SOFIT. These 
results support the notion that the ontological 
structure aligns with the internal schema used by 
experts to make judgments about the relative concern 
of insider threat cases. In contrast, the mixed results 
of the Role-Count model may reflect the fact that 
judgments of level of concern at the individual 
indicator level matter more than judgments of 
indicator role. This suggests that the raters considered 
both psychological and technical indicators in rough 
proportion to their risk. Future research should 
investigate the conditions in which indicator role 
might have a more substantial impact on judgments 
of insider threat risk.  
As constructed, the SOFIT ontology specifies 
concerning indicators, and consistent with this 
construction, our study showed that expert ratings of 
concern for all individual indicators were at least 
somewhat concerning on average (i.e., >20 on a 100-
point scale). Indicators relating to the personal 
predisposition role type tended to reflect cases that 
were of lesser concern (positive β weight in Table 4). 
Since role type does not add validity to level of 
concern, this result likely reflects the fact that the 
personal predisposition role has the lowest average 
concern. Because the number of indicators in a case 
is limited, the roles do not occur independently in the 
sample of cases. This means that a case that includes 
one or more personal predisposition indicators would 
be likely to include fewer indicators from more 
concerning roles, such as technical precursors or 
access paths.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The results reported here support the inclusion of 
behavioral/social indicators of insider threat in 
modeling expert judgments, and further suggest that 
operational contexts relying on analyst judgment may 
benefit from decision support tools that use the 
SOFIT ontology. More specifically, we conclude that 
decision support tools for insider threat assessments 
should take account of the class structure. Further 
research is warranted to assess the possible impact of 
indicator role types. 
 
7.1. Limitations 
The results of the current and previous expert 
knowledge elicitation studies [7] are proxies for 
empirically investigating the predictive strength of 
indicators in an operational setting. Validity of 
proposed approaches and models cannot be faithfully 
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determined without testing in real operational 
settings. The present line of research on insider threat 
indicator structure seems to warrant further 
investigation using real data with ground truth to 
validate the models beyond the prediction of expert 
judgments. 
 
7.2. Future Work 
 
To better understand relationships among 
constructs and their influence on insider threat 
judgments, additional expert knowledge elicitation 
studies should be conducted.  
We continue to implement SOFIT functionality to 
support qualitative and quantitative insider threat 
assessment approaches. The intended solution will 
provide an interface to explore information beyond a 
simple list of indicators for a case being evaluated, so 
that the analyst may be provided additional 
information that serves to explain or justify the 
assessment. With this knowledge, the analyst can 
make an informed decision about forwarding the case 
for further investigation. 
Our team has also begun to implement 
functionality within the ontology to help an 
organization assess its insider threat monitoring 
approach. This is based on a comparison of an 
organization’s indicator portfolio with the domain of 
insider threat indicators specified in the ontology. 
This could be used in the design of a web-based 
assessment tool such as reported in [28], and it would 
support the mandate of the National Insider Threat 
Task Force to conduct technology maturity level 
assessments of US departments/agencies capabilities 
for detecting insider threats [29].  
The present research offers two contributions. 
First. the results advance research on insider threat 
indicators. Second, results reported here can facilitate 
the development of ontology-based operational tools 
for both insider threat assessment and technical 
maturity level assessments of organizational insider 
threat program portfolios. This research will lead to 
the development and use of more effective, 
knowledge-based decision support tools for insider 
threat assessment. 
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